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An Empirical Investigation of the Principal Top Management Styles in the Emphasis of 
Multiple Forms of Controls 
 
Lili-Anne Kihn 
 
18 May, 2009 
Abstract 
 
This study offers empirical evidence of the principal top management styles in the emphasis of 
multiple forms of controls. In particular, it analyzed the principal styles in how top managers 
emphasize financial, nonfinancial and selected behavioral controls in the performance evaluations of 
foreign subsidiary managers and whether the different styles result in performance differences. 
Hypotheses were tested, using cluster analysis and analysis of variance, with documentary and 
survey data collected from business unit top managers of multinational companies headquartered in 
Finland. The main results identify, describe and profile a total of six principal styles in the emphasis 
of financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls. Overall, the results suggest that managers differ 
significantly in the way they emphasize controls and that all styles are not as effective in enhancing 
performance.  
 
Keywords: behavioral control, financial control, management styles, multinational companies, 
nonfinancial control, performance evaluation, performance measures   
 
1. Introduction  
 
A large body of accounting research has explained the use of various kinds of controls and 
performance measures in organizations. As a result of the empirical research on output and 
behavioral controls, many possible outcomes of, and factors affecting and moderating, the use of 
such controls are evidenced in the literature (Abernethy and Brownell, 1997; Abernethy and 
Stoelwinder, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1985; Kihn, 2001, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Kren and Kerr, 1993). 
Likewise, research on strategic performance management systems (e.g., Goold and Quinn, 1990; 
Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996; Lynch and Cross, 1991; Smith 1995), has explained how various 
kinds of financial and nonfinancial performance measures have been used in various circumstances. 
Behavioral accounting research has distinguished various ways in how people utilize accounting 
information (see Deegan, 2004 and Macintosh, 1991 for literature reviews). However, empirical 
evidence on the different styles individual managers have in using multiple types of controls and 
performance measures is still sparse, despite the fact that the question as to how various controls 
should be weighed to improve performance has been identified as a problematic issue for managers 
using multiple controls (Dilla and Steinbert, 2005; Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Ittner, Larcker, and 
Meyer, 2003; Lipe and Salterio, 2000; Nørreklit, 2000). This paper aims to address that gap.   
 
The objective of this study is to empirically analyze: (1) the principal styles in how top managers 
emphasize various forms of controls, and (2) whether the different styles result in performance 
differences. Whilst various classifications have been developed in previous research, the formal 
controls examined in this study include ‘output’ and ‘behavioral’ controls (Ouchi, 1979; Thompson, 
1967).  This classification is based on the notion that the two aspects of people’s work that can be 
controlled are their outputs and behavior. Consequently, managerial performance evaluations can be 
outcome- and/or behavior-based. Examples of financial (output) controls are profit, return-on-
investment, and residual income. Nonfinancial (operational output) controls include, for example, 
market share, quality, production volume and customer satisfaction. In this study on multinational 
companies, behavioral controls refer to, for example, whether people follow rules and procedures, 
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achieve cost budgets and production standards, and present expenditure cutting proposals. Hence, the 
examined ‘output’ and ‘behavioral’ controls are used synonymously with ‘results’ and ‘action 
accountability’ controls1 (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). 
 
Top management’s emphasis on financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls is examined in the 
performance evaluations of foreign subsidiary managers in Finnish-based multinational companies. 
Based on their emphasis on the three types of controls examined, managers are classified into various 
groups, each of which shares a relatively similar emphasis on the controls. Each of the groups is 
profiled based on selected key organizational and individual level background variables such as 
extent of business unit profitability, size, worldwide operations, manager’s work experience and age.  
 
The main contribution of this study is that it is the first to identify the principal top management 
styles in the simultaneous use of financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls and performance 
measures. It also contributes to our knowledge by exploring the question of whether different styles 
result in performance differences. As a result of this study, a total of six principal performance 
evaluation styles are identified, described and profiled and certain performance consequences are 
proposed.  These results are important in that they improve understanding of the various ways people 
can use information in performance evaluation decisions and its implications. Whilst the results 
cannot be generalized to other populations, Finnish-based multinational companies provided a 
fruitful developed-country context to explore these questions of great importance to many 
multinational companies and countries. 
 
Note that Finnish companies are probably quite similar with other developed western companies in 
many characteristics, such as goals and structural properties, since Finnish business studies and 
Finland’s educational system have already long been strongly influence by western countries 
(Pihlanto, 1986). 
 
The next section offers a review of the literature leading up to the development of the research 
propositions. The sample, measures and statistical methods are described thereafter, followed by 
analysis of the statistical results. Finally, the results are discussed and various conclusions presented. 
  
2. Theory 
 
A substantial amount of previous behavioral accounting literature has analyzed how different 
information user groups (such as managers, investors, analysts or auditors) react to or behave when 
providing, interpreting or using certain accounting information, presented in various forms and 
contexts (see Deegan, 2004 for a review). While the results have at times been contradictory, overall 
the behavioral research has stressed that differences, for example, in people’s abilities, strategies and 
knowledge can in turn result in substantially different ways of using accounting information in 
decisions, and that “these differences are more striking than any similarities” (Macintosh, 1985, p. 
86; Pihlanto, 1989a). 
 
Hopwood’s (1972) classic study was the first to analyze the various distinct styles of using financial 
(budgeted and actual cost) information by cost center managers in performance evaluations. In his 
study, the leadership styles observed ranged from primarily budget- and actual cost-based to 
primarily nonaccounting-based. First, in a “budget constrained style,” managers’ performance was 
primarily evaluated on the basis of their ability to continually meet the short-term budget. Second, in 
a “profit conscious style,” managers’ performance was evaluated on the basis of their ability to 
increase the long-term effectiveness of their units in relation to the goals of the organization; for this, 
accounting data was also used, but in a flexible and creative manner, and where necessary, 
                                                 
1
 Note that this study focuses on selected behavioral ‘action accountability’ controls rather than on any kind of behavioral 
or action control. 
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supplemented by alternative sources of information. Third, in a “nonaccounting style”, accounting 
data played a relatively unimportant part in the evaluation of the managers’ performance. Since 
accounting information was used in all the three styles in Hopwood’s (1972) study, it was found 
relevant. However, given that managers also desire data beyond accounting, accounting data 
appeared not complete for those managers (cf. Birnberg and Sadhu, 1986, p. 120).  
 
After it was realized that financial controls are one of a number of possible criteria a manager can 
use in performance evaluations, several scholars examined whether managers rely on financial 
information in varying degrees (Birnberg and Sadhu, 1986, p. 130) examining high versus low 
emphasis of financial control in performance evaluations, often in terms of “tight” versus “loose” 
control (see also Hartmann, 2000; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). This is seen both in the 
contingency studies that followed Hopwood’s (1972) and Otley’s (1978) empirical studies and in 
research on multinational companies. The contingency-based reliance on accounting performance 
measures literature has typically been concerned with issues such as whether accounting measures 
are subject to limitations, may be incomplete, and “can become dysfunctional when carried too far” 
(Birnberg and Sadhu, 1986, p. 132; Hartmann, 2000). The contingency studies have argued and 
found that effectiveness of tight versus loose control depends on the situation. In studies on 
multinational companies, the predominant result has, nevertheless, been that top managers at 
headquarters tend to use the same financial controls, such as return-on-investment (ROI), profit, and 
budgets, in the evaluation of foreign operations and managers as for domestic operations and 
managers and place a high emphasis on them (see Kihn, 2008 for a review). While the above studies 
have provided insights about differences in the extent of tight versus loose financial control, they 
have analyzed how accounting information is generally used in organizations.   
 
In contrast, Pihlanto’s (1989b) behavioral study on 41 decision-makers of a large Finnish company 
analyzed and found clear differences in people’s decision-making styles, and in their perceptions 
about the nature, roles, and use of accounting information.
2
 Some of the decision-makers, such as 
accounting personnel, top managers and some business unit managers, were found to interact 
regularly with each other in accounting terms. Top managers, in particular, had to a large extent trust 
accounting information while making decisions. The common focus of interest probably aided in 
creating a shared interpretation about the reality of the firm. However, many of the accountants and 
accounting managers as well as the other decision makers at various business units and hierarchical 
levels were also found to differ in the use of accounting information. For example, there appeared to 
be substantial differences in the perceptions regarding decision-making styles and use of accounting 
information between the leader and staff in three of the six business units examined.     
 
While little research exists on how managers combine accounting information and various other 
types of information, Pihlanto (1989b, 1990) also analyzed the ways accounting information, soft 
nonfinancial information and discussions with colleagues were used in decision-making. He found 
that soft nonfinancial information and discussions with colleagues were perceived to be highly 
important in complementing, and even substituting for, formal accounting information in the 
organization examined. Whilst all the surveyed decision-maker groups, ranging from various kinds 
of directors and managers to accountants and other employees, viewed informal information highly 
important, the employees of the marketing department seemed to have the most positive perceptions 
about the importance of informal information and most negative perceptions of accounting 
information. These findings were explained by the observations that the nature of marketing is highly 
extroverted, marketing personnel were found to emphasize intuition and feeling in decision-making, 
and the problems of marketing are such that accounting information cannot even, at best, offer very 
much aid in solving them (Pihlanto, 1990, pp. 110-111).  
 
                                                 
2
 His analysis of decision-making styles was based on the Jungian (1971) typology of different psychological types, i.e., 
sensation, intuition, thinking, and/or feeling. 
 4 
A few recent studies have addressed how managers combine various kinds of balanced scorecard 
(BSC) performance measures in performance evaluations. Lipe and Salterio’s (2000) and Dilla and 
Stenbart’s (2005) studies provide examples. They analyzed whether managers complement or 
substitute BSC measures unique to a business unit’s strategy with performance measures common 
across units. Lipe and Salterio (2000) found that MBA students assigned the role of superior 
managers ignored unique BSC measures and instead based their performance evaluations solely on 
common measures. This is of concern in that inattention to unique measures could undermine the 
usefulness of the BSC as a strategic management system (cf., Kaplan and Norton, 1996). In line with 
Bonner (1990), Lipe and Salterio (2000) suggested that their result may reflect the participants’ lack 
of experience with the BSC: knowledgeable decision makers are likely to weight clues differently 
than less knowledgeable decision makers, especially on complex, less structured tasks. Dilla and 
Steinbart (2005) followed this up and, indeed, found that undergraduate accounting and information 
systems majors who are knowledgeable about the BSC attended to both common and unique 
measures, but place greater emphasis on the former. Their results held in both performance 
evaluation and bonus allocation decisions. Dilla and Steinbart (2005) attributed their results to the 
knowledge participants acquired during classroom training on the design of the BSC, although could 
not rule out the possibility that their results might differ from previous research because of 
differences in the student samples. In the same way, the level of managers’ experience could in part 
impact how financial controls are combined with nonfinancial and behavioral controls, i.e., 
complemented or substituted for.  
 
At minimum, the above studies suggest that managers use multiple forms of control information in 
decision-making in general and also in managerial performance evaluations and bonus allocations in 
particular. The results also suggest that all managers do not use information in the same way and 
open up interesting paths for future research. First, while it not quite clear how individual managers 
emphasize multiple forms of controls in general, and financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls 
in particular, individual-level differences seem possible. Second, there is lack of knowledge on how 
individual managers emphasize such controls in performance evaluations. Third, there is a lack of 
information of how individual managers place emphasis on the controls in multinational companies, 
although they operate in highly complex contexts and have less information on what happens in the 
overseas contexts unfamiliar to them. This study will explore the following research proposition in a 
sample of multinational companies in order to identify, describe and profile the principal styles of 
top management in the use of financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls.  
 
Proposition 1: Top managers differ significantly in the way they emphasize financial, nonfinancial 
and behavioral controls in the performance evaluation of foreign subsidiary managers. 
 
Despite concern on dysfunctional effects of high reliance on accounting performance measures, 
several scholars have reported positive associations between tight financial control – typically budget 
control– and individual or firm performance (Brownell, 1982; Hassel, 1991; Hofstede, 1968; Simons, 
1988; Stedry, 1960). The positive associations have been explained to probably result due to positive 
motivational effects, cost-effectiveness in a multinational environment, and/or elimination of slack.  
 
Even though the empirical results have been mixed (for reviews, see Ittner et al., 2003, pp. 718-720; 
Davis and Albright, 2004, pp. 137-138), the normative literature on strategic performance 
measurement systems has argued that the best results are achieved by combining financial and 
nonfinancial controls (e.g., Goold and Quinn, 1990; Lynch and Cross, 1991; Kaplan and Norton, 
1992; Smith, 1995). Ultimately, a balanced use of carefully selected financial and nonfinancial 
indicators can allow managers to view performance in several areas simultaneously and to provide 
more outward-looking, longer term and strategic perspectives. Those in turn, have been expected to 
enhance long-term performance.  
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Based on previous research, it seems quite possible that all styles may not be as effective in 
improving short-term performance. The BSC literature (e.g., Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1993, 1996) 
has recommended a balanced use of various types of performance measures, but identified the 
financial goal(s) as the ultimate goal(s), whereas the other goals (i.e., customer, internal, innovation 
and learning goals) are considered to be ways of achieving the ultimate goal(s).  Kihn’s (2007a, 
2007b) study on 35 business units of Finnish based industrial multinational companies found that in 
the short-term, and regardless of the environmental contingencies analyzed, financial controls were 
more effective than nonfinancial or behavioral controls in improving short-term profitability, but 
packages comprising financial and selected behavioral (action accountability) controls in particular 
could improve short-term profitability even more. The styles with very high (low) financial and 
action accountability controls result in the highest (lowest) short-term profitability, if the above 
mentioned regression analysis results are considered typical. The following research proposition tests 
for the overall expectation: 
 
Proposition 2: Differences in top management’s styles in the emphasis of financial, nonfinancial and 
behavioral controls in the performance evaluations of foreign subsidiary managers are 
associated with differences in financial performance.  
 
3. Method  
 
3.1 Sample 
 
The data of this study were collected as a part of a larger survey. The target sample of the study 
comprised the entire population of 102 manufacturing, banking, and consulting multinational 
companies headquartered in Finland. In all these companies the Finnish parent company held at least 
one overseas manufacturing, banking, or consulting subsidiary with a more than a 50% interest. 
Therefore, pure export and import companies were beyond the scope of this study. The foreign 
subsidiaries of these companies appeared relatively autonomous, in that most of the firms had 
decentralized their value-adding activities (production, marketing sales, etc.) and highly delegated 
operative decisions to foreign subsidiary managers.  
 
In the first phase of data collection, data were collected by administering a cross-sectional mail 
survey. The survey was sent to such managers who are in positions lending access to information 
about the performance evaluations of foreign subsidiary managers These were typically business 
group or divisional managers in larger diversified firms, and corporate directors (such as financial 
directors, vice presidents, or presidents) in smaller single-business firms. One respondent was 
selected from each business unit (or division). The respondents were identified based on telephone 
calls, and on information derived from annual reports. 
 
After pre-testing the wording and content of the questionnaire three times in a sample of thirteen 
practitioners and academic experts in order to improve the content and construct validity, reliability 
and objectivity of survey questions, a total of 176 questionnaires were distributed by air mail to the 
business unit top managers of the 102 multinational companies. Dillman’s (1978) total design 
method for mail surveys was applied. One hundred and three usable responses were received from 
about 60 multinational companies (with a response rate of 58.8%) and 103 business units 
representing 58.5% of all mailed surveys. The companies of the 103 participants represent a wide 
range of industries including metals (27.2%); forest (15.5%); glass or steel (8.7%); consulting 
(6.8%); chemical (5.8%); oil, coal or nuclear (5.8%); plastic (5.8%); food, drink or tobacco (4.9%); 
banking (3.9%); textile, clothing, leather or shoes (2.9%); furniture (2.9%); electronics, computer 
etc. (2.9%); printing (1.0%); mining (1.0%); and energy or water (1.0%).
3
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 In 3.9% of the cases the information was not available. 
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In the second phase of data collection, both documentary sources (such as annual reports) and 
surveys were used to collect data on year-end return on investment (ROI), number of subsidiaries 
and number of employees. It was possible to get a total of nine ROI values from the annual reports. 
Because ROI values are normally unavailable for conglomerate business units and for privately held 
firms (i.e., not listed on the stock exchange), additional performance data were collected with a mail 
survey (and four follow-ups at the corporate level). These attempts yielded data on several business 
units increasing the total number of responses to 36. This sample represents about 20% of the total 
target population of 176 respondents, and about 35% of the 103 initial respondents. Reasons such as 
financial information not being available because of the information’s confidential nature or because 
of mergers were identified as the cause of no response in 12 cases. 
 
3.2  Measures 
 
Controls. The dependent variable of this study assesses the extent to which senior managers at 
headquarters perceive that they use (or do not use) financial, nonfinancial, and behavioral controls in 
the performance evaluation of foreign subsidiary managers. Senior managers’ perceptions were 
assessed with five-item five-point Likert scales. Examples of financial controls (profit, ROI, residual 
income, etc.), nonfinancial results controls (e.g., market share, quality and production volume), and 
behavioral controls (e.g., follow rules and procedures, achieve cost budgets & production standards 
and propose expenditure programs) were provided. 
 
Based on Keating’s (1997) questions on managerial performance evaluation, the respondents were 
asked to indicate: 
1) The importance of controls in the evaluation of foreign subsidiary manager performance; 
2) The frequency with which meetings are arranged with foreign subsidiary managers to discuss 
their performance on those controls;  
3) The extent to which controls reflect the successful efforts of the subsidiary managers;  
4) The attention paid by senior management to the periodic results of controls; and  
5) The impact of good or poor results measured on the controls on managers’ rated performance.  
Each item was rated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all/not at all important) to 5 (very much/very 
important).  Low (high) average values on the 1-5 scale indicate a low (high) emphasis on controls.
4
 
 
Background variables. Certain individual and organizational level background variables were 
included in the study to aid in profiling the top managers and their business units. The following two 
individual level variables were included in the survey analysis to provide key information about the 
top managers:  extent of work experience at the company and age of respondent. Both of these were 
measured in number of years. The respondents were asked to indicate how many years they had been 
employed by the current company and in what year they were born. Whilst not a complete survey 
document, appendix 1 details the survey questions used in this study.  
 
The following organizational level variables were also included in the analysis: financial 
performance, extent of world-scale operations and organization size. Financial performance of a 
business unit was measured as ROI (see also Simons, 1988) using year-end numbers collected (cf., 
Kihn, 2007a). Extent of world-scale operations was measured as subsidiaries outside Europe as a 
percentage of all subsidiaries. The size of organization was approximated according to the number of 
employees. The organizational-level data was collected primarily from documentary sources such as 
                                                 
4
 Whilst summative scales were not used in the subsequent statistical analysis, internal reliability of this instrument was, 
nevertheless, assessed with Cronbach’s (1951) alpha statistic resulting in an alpha statistic of 0.84 for the emphasis of 
financial controls, 0.79 for the emphasis of nonfinancial controls, and 0.83 for the emphasis of behavioral controls.  
 
 7 
annual reports and additional surveys to a smaller extent.  Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics 
for all the variables of this study.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.3 Statistical methods 
 
The research propositions of this study were assessed with the aid of cluster analysis and analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). Cluster analysis is a statistical technique that sorts observations into similar 
groups. It has unparalleled ability to classify a large number of observations along multiple variables. 
(Ketchen and Shook, 1996, p. 441, p. 453). According to Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998, p. 
258), cluster analysis can provide rich insights into the multiple elements of management accounting.  
In this study, cluster analysis was used to provide empirical evidence about the ways top managers 
combine and weigh controls so that individuals in the same cluster would be more similar to one 
another than to individuals in other clusters.  
 
Euclidean distance, often referred to as straight-line distance, and the most commonly recognized 
measure of the similarity between two objects (Hair et al., 2006, p. 557, p. 575), was used as a 
distance measure. A hierarchical clustering algorithm was selected using Ward’s method, which, 
according to Hair et al. (2006, 590) is probably one of the best available. This method is based on the 
total sum of squares within clusters. It is preferred when a wide range of clustering solutions is to be 
examined and the sample size is moderate (Hair et al., 2006, 593).  
 
A dendrogram was examined to determine how many clusters should be selected. Thereafter, clusters 
were named, validated with a selected outcome variable (financial performance), and profiled with 
demographic variables using ANOVA. Financial performance in terms of short-term profitability 
was calculated for each cluster as an outcome variable. The clusters were also profiled using several 
of the respondents’ demographic variables and their units to further describe how each cluster 
differed from the others (if at all). The following variables were used: age of respondent, length of 
respondent’s work experience at current company, extent of world-scale operations and organization 
size.  
 
4. Results and analysis 
 
4.1 Cluster analysis results 
 
The first research proposition of this study expected that top managers differ significantly in the way 
they emphasize financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls in the performance evaluation of 
foreign subsidiary managers. This proposition was assessed with the aid of cluster analysis. When 
analyzing the data, the dendrogram showed that either a three- or six-cluster solution could be 
selected. Both solutions were checked. A three-cluster solution suggested one cluster was high on all 
controls (i.e., “tight”), another low on all controls (i.e., “loose control”), and a third somewhere in the 
middle, merely suggesting variations in the intensity of tight versus lose control. Whilst one of the 
clusters of the six-cluster solution was small, each of the six clusters was more distinct and varied 
more in its magnitude of clustering variables than in the three-cluster solution. Therefore, the six-
cluster solution was considered more suitable to select for further analysis (cf. Hair et al., 2006, p. 
611).  
 
The mean scores of the variables within each cluster and the F-tests for each cluster are presented in 
Table 2. The F-tests indicate that statistically significant differences exist for individual variables 
across clusters, providing further empirical support for the theoretical expectation of differences in 
top management styles. The cluster analysis results clearly show that each cluster differs from the 
others, with respect to the ways top management emphasizes the various forms of controls. 
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Therefore, the first research proposition of this study is empirically supported. The following are the 
six clusters each indicating a differing management style in the emphasis of controls: 
  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
1) High emphasis on financial controls – The first cluster in this study (Table 2, column 1) 
describes a management style in which top management compared to the other clusters mostly 
ranked third in emphasis on financial controls, fourth in emphasis on nonfinancial controls and 
sixth in emphasis on behavioral controls. Hence, managers placed a relatively high emphasis on 
financial controls, but less emphasis on nonfinancial controls and even less emphasis on 
behavioral controls. 
2) Very high emphasis on financial controls and high emphasis on nonfinancial controls  – 
Compared to the other clusters, top management in the second cluster (Table 2, Column 2) 
ranked first through fourth (mostly around second) in emphasis on financial controls, second 
through fourth (overall third) in emphasis on nonfinancial controls, and second through fourth in 
emphasis on behavioral controls. Hence, managers place a very high emphasis on financial 
controls and a high emphasis on behavioral and nonfinancial controls.  
3) Tight control – Managers of the third cluster (Table 2, Column 3) ranked first compared to the 
other clusters in their emphasis of financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls. Hence, they 
clearly place the greatest emphasis on all the controls examined. This was the case for each and 
every item. Therefore, this cluster is termed comprehensive or tight control.  
4) High emphasis on financial and nonfinancial controls – An examination of the fourth cluster 
(Table 2, Column 4) revealed that compared to other clusters, top management mostly ranked 
fourth in emphasis on financial controls, second in emphasis on nonfinancial controls, and mostly 
third in emphasis on behavioral controls. However, based on the mean values, top managers’ 
absolute emphasis on financial controls was higher than on nonfinancial controls. Hence, the 
fourth cluster suggests a style in which managers place less emphasis on behavioral controls, but 
a very high emphasis on financial and nonfinancial controls.  
5) Loose control – In the fifth cluster (Table 2, Column 5) managers clearly place a low emphasis 
on all the controls examined. In contrast to the other clusters, they place the least amount of 
emphasis on financial and nonfinancial controls and the emphasis on behavioral controls was 
second lowest. This cluster is termed loose control.  
6) Emphasis on behavioral and nonfinancial controls – The sixth cluster (Table 2, Column 6) is 
very small representing only four top managers. In this style, top management also placed little 
emphasis on financial controls both on an absolute and relative basis. These managers placed 
higher emphasis on both behavioral (ranking mostly second or third) and nonfinancial controls 
(ranking second through sixth). Based on the absolute mean values, top management placed only 
slightly higher emphasis on behavioral than nonfinancial controls. Therefore, this style is called 
emphasis on behavioral and nonfinancial controls. 
 
4.2 Profiling the clusters 
 
The second research proposition of this study was developed to assess whether differences in top 
management’s styles in the emphasis of financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls are correlated 
with differences in financial performance. The second proposition was assessed using ANOVA. In 
the following, each cluster is first described in more detail. The available performance data are used 
to order the clusters from highest to lowest performance. The clusters are then profiled with selected 
individual and organizational level variables to provide details about the top managers and their 
units. As Table 1, Column 3, shows, cluster 3 (hereafter C3) ranked first in performance, followed by 
C2, C4, C1, and C5. There are no performance data for C6.
5
 
 
                                                 
5
 It might be related to its small size of four data points. 
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Top management in C3, which was the highest performing group (mean ROI 21.12%), appeared to 
place the greatest emphasis on all the examined controls reflecting tight control. The respondents 
were, on average, about 48.2 years old (ranking fourth). They had worked, on average, about 10.5 
years at their current company having the shortest experience of all managers. On average, over half 
(64%) of their foreign subsidiaries were outside Europe, suggesting that these units were highly 
involved in worldwide operations. (In fact only C1 had a higher proportion of subsidiaries outside 
Europe, i.e., 67%). Measured by number of employees (mean 1382), the units in this group were the 
fourth largest. 
 
C2 and C4 also consisted of high performers, as reflected by the ROI-values of 17.75% and 17.29%, 
respectively. In C2, that ranked second in performance, top managers applied the style very high 
emphasis on financial controls and high emphasis on nonfinancial controls. On average, the C2 
respondents were the most senior (with a mean of about 51.0 years) and had worked about 17 years 
at their company (ranking third). This cluster comprised the largest units (with a mean size of 3315 
employees), and the foreign subsidiaries were mostly (61%) outside Europe. 
 
C4 ranked third in performance, being very close to C2. The style used by the C4 top managers is 
high emphasis on financial and nonfinancial controls. On average, this cluster had the youngest 
respondents, with an average age of about 46.2 years. On average, they had worked about 12 years at 
their company (ranking fifth in work experience at the current company). Their units had the smallest 
proportion (28%) of foreign subsidiaries outside Europe, and were smaller than the units in most 
other groups. In contrast to C2, this cluster comprised some of the smaller units. With an average of 
only 694 employees, the companies of C2 ranked fifth in size.  
 
C1 ranked fourth in performance, with an ROI of 10.9%. Top management of C1 clearly applied the 
high emphasis on financial controls style. On average, respondents in this group were also among 
the most senior (second oldest with a mean of about 50.6 years) and had worked many years at their 
company (ranking second with a mean of about 18 years). These units were the second largest (with 
2289 employees), and about two thirds of their foreign subsidiaries were outside Europe (ranking 
second in world-scale operations). 
 
C5 ranked fifth in performance, with an ROI of 2.3%. Top management in this cluster applied loose 
control. On average, top management in this cluster were younger than in most others, but also 
middle-aged. They ranked fifth with a mean age of 46.5 years. They had worked about 12.7 years at 
their company (ranking fourth). The size of their units ranked third (with 1523 employees). The 
foreign subsidiaries operated mostly within Europe with only 36% of subsidiaries outside Europe. 
Accordingly, they ranked fifth in the extent of worldwide operations. 
 
There was no performance data for the small C6 cluster representing emphasis on behavioral and 
nonfinancial controls. On average, the respondents in this group were 50.0 years old (ranking third) 
and had worked 20 years at their company (i.e., longer than the others). All their foreign subsidiaries 
were outside Europe. The multinational companies in this cluster were the smallest (with a mean of 
only 112 employees).  
 
In summary, when the six clusters or styles were profiled with selected demographic and background 
variables, certain tendencies appeared to exist between top management styles and short-term 
business unit profitability, but not between other variables. In this study, the managers of the highest 
performing cluster tended to place the highest emphasis on all the controls, i.e., a tight control style.  
The managers of the second highest performing cluster placed very high emphasis on financial 
controls and high emphasis on nonfinancial controls. In contrast, the managers of the lowest 
performing cluster placed low, if not the least, emphasis on the controls, reflecting a loose control 
style. The others styles, representing various kinds of combinations of financial, nonfinancial and 
behavioral controls, and profitability levels existed between these two extremes. In conclusion, the 
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data seem to broadly support the second research proposition of this study. Consequently, both 
propositions of this study are supported. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions  
 
Previous studies have focused on how organizations generally use multiple forms of controls and 
performance measures. This study was the first to identify the principal top management styles in the 
use of financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls. It also explored the question of whether the 
different styles result in performance differences. Following Ouchi (1979), Thomson (1967) and a 
series of empirical studies (Abernethy & Brownell, 1997; Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995; 
Eisenhard, 1985; Kihn, 2001, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; and Kren and Kerr, 1993), this study advanced 
empirical analysis of output and behavioral controls.  
 
The results reveal that all three types of controls were simultaneously used by all the top managers 
surveyed, linking foreign subsidiary managers’ performance evaluations to reported results and 
behaviors. As expected, the statistical results also suggested several clusters reflecting differing 
management styles in the emphasis of the controls. A total of six clusters could be identified, which 
were described and profiled with selected individual and organizational level variables. In brief, 
when the clusters were compared to each other, the following styles were identified: high emphasis 
on financial controls, very high emphasis on financial controls and high emphasis on nonfinancial 
controls, high emphasis on financial and nonfinancial controls, tight control, loose control and 
emphasis on nonfinancial and behavioral controls. These results indicate that in addition to tight and 
loose control, different versions of high versus low emphasis of controls also exist. The emphasis of 
financial controls was highest in the clusters tight control, very high emphasis on financial controls 
and high emphasis on nonfinancial controls, and high emphasis on financial controls; and lowest in 
the clusters loose control, and emphasis on nonfinancial and behavioral controls.
6
  
 
When the six styles (clusters) were profiled with selected organizational (business unit) and 
individual level background variables, certain tendencies appeared to exist between business unit top 
management styles and short-term business unit profitability. The managers of the highest 
performing cluster tended to place the highest emphasis on all the controls, i.e., a tight control style. 
In contrast, the managers of the lowest performing cluster placed low, if not the least, emphasis on 
the controls reflecting a loose control style. The others styles and profitability levels lie between 
these two extremes. The other background variables also showed high differences, but do not 
indicate clear tendencies.  
 
The results of this study have at least three implications for management accounting theories. The 
first lesson is that top managers behave differently when using multiple forms of controls in 
performance evaluation decisions. This result is in line with and extends previous behavioral 
accounting research (see Macintosh, 1985; and Pihlanto, 1989a,b, 1990), which has reported human 
differences in the emphasis of accounting information to be striking. In this study, striking 
differences were also identified in the use of nonfinancial and behavioral controls. This result is of 
importance to theories on multiple controls and strategic performance management systems such as 
balanced scorecards.   
 
Second, the results add to the evidence that decision makers do not give equal weight to all controls 
and performance measures (cf., Ittner, Larcker, and Meyer, 2003; Dilla, and Steinbert, 2005) by 
showing that while top managers simultaneously use all three types of controls, there are statistically 
significant differences in how they are emphasized. These results also suggest that top management 
                                                 
6
 Note that styles such as the following were not included in the six cluster solution of the main styles: emphasis on 
behavioral controls, emphasis on financial and behavioral controls, and no use of financial, nonfinancial and/ or 
behavioral controls. 
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views each of them as relevant but not complete information, and combines the controls in such a 
way that they complement, rather than substitute for, each other. This result found in a sample of top 
managers of Finnish-based multinational companies is also in line with and extends Hopwood’s 
(1972) findings on the use of accounting and nonaccounting information in managerial performance 
evaluations, and supports Pihlanto’s (1989b, 1990) study on decision-making to the extent that 
multiple sources of information were used to complement each other, although no signs of 
substituting accounting information with other forms of information was observed in this study.  
 
Third, the identified tendencies between top management styles on the use of controls and the extent 
of business unit short-term profitability are in line with, and extend, the findings of Kihn (2007a, 
2007b), whose multiple regression analysis findings proposed, that financial controls are more 
effective than nonfinancial or behavioral controls in improving profitability. In this study tight 
control style appears to result in highest short-term profitability probably since it included the 
highest possible emphasis on both financial and behavioral (action accountability) controls, and 
loose control in the lowest short-term profitability (cf., Kihn, 2007a). In addition, four other principal 
styles were identified in this study. However, it was not possible to assess whether packages 
comprising financial and behavioral (action accountability) controls in particular could improve 
short-term profitability even more (cf., Kihn, 2007a, 2007b), since such a cluster was not identified 
in this study.   
 
The managerial implications of the results of this study are twofold: first, performance monitoring 
and evaluation appear worthwhile, but all management styles are not as effective in enhancing short-
term profitability. Second, the results are suggested to be particularly helpful in understanding the 
main management styles. This is valuable for interpreting individual manager’s styles in the use of 
various types of control information.   
 
This study is subject to certain limitations. First, whilst various styles are likely to exist, this study 
identified the principal styles in the use of financial, nonfinancial and behavioral controls only. 
Furthermore, the examined behavioral controls included certain kinds of action accountability 
controls (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). Second, survey research does not provide as controlled 
results as controlled experiments. However, it was possible to gain access to top management 
evidence in this study. Third, in being an explorative data technique, cluster analysis provides a less 
rigorous set of techniques than, for example, regression analysis. Furthermore, equal weights were 
given to different questions on controls in the interpretation of the cluster analysis results. For 
example, data on the question “How important do you perceive each of the following types of 
measurers to be in the evaluation of overseas managers” was given the same weigh in the analysis 
than data on the question “how often do you arrange meetings with overseas managers to discuss 
their performance on the following types of measures.” Nevertheless, as pointed out by Chenhall and 
Langfield-Smith (1998, p. 258), cluster analysis can provide rich insights that could not be obtained 
with other methods, but can be further analyzed in future research. In this study it could be used to 
identify top managers’ principal styles in the use of controls. Fourth, some of the analyzed clusters 
are small in size and/or lacked data. Fifth, it is not sure whether the higher ROI is associated with a 
higher use of financial controls, since the firms in the tight control cluster could be in industries that 
have higher ROI. Note also that a high ROI can sometimes be a sign of ‘harvesting.’ Finally, the 
results provide evidence on Finnish-based MNCs, and should not be generalized to other companies 
or other countries. Nevertheless, they provide a useful first step in this line of research. Due to these 
limitations, the empirical results of this study are tentative in nature, but confirm the expectations 
that there are clear differences in the simultaneous emphasis of multiple forms controls by top 
managers and that all top management styles are not as good at improving short-term performance.  
 
Future accounting research on output and behavioral controls as well as on strategic performance 
measurement systems such as balanced scorecards could be increasingly directed at further analyzing 
the various ways in which people use them, whether various individual characteristics influence 
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control choices, and what kind of personal, organizational and long-term profitability effects the 
various control choices have. The research could also be extended to other samples. For example, 
perceptions of domestic and foreign subordinate managers could also be analyzed to compare and 
contrast how subordinate managers perceive the intended styles.  
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TABLE 1.  Descriptive statistics 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                 Mean   Std.Dev. Min. Max  N 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Avg. emphasis on financial control           4.48 0.55 2.4 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on F1
1
    4.75 0.50 3.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on F2     4.34 0.82 2.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on F3     4.38 0.78 2.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on F4     4.52 0.62 2.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on F5     4.38 0.76 2.0 5.0 103 
 
Avg. emphasis on nonfinancial control  4.23 0.55 2.8 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on N1
2
    4.35 0.65 2.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on N2     4.24 0.86 1.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on N3     4.24 0.69 3.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on N4     4.19 0.78 2.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on N5     4.12 0.74 2.0 5.0 103 
 
Avg. emphasis on behavioral control          3.89 0.69 2.2  5.0 103 
  Emphasis on B1
3
    4.16 0.75 2.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on B2     3.91 1.03 1.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on B3     3.93 0.87 2.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on B4     3.63 0.94 2.0 5.0 103 
  Emphasis on B5     3.82 0.89 1.0 5.0 103  
 
Work experience           14.75 8.92 1            35 103  
Age of respondent          48.85 6.48       31           64 103  
Short-term profitability              14.91 8.92      -4.0          35   36 
Extent of word-scale operations            0.52 0.50 0.0 1.0   93  
Size              2086.60 2047.51      28        8193   60 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 F1 – F5  refer to the five survey items on financial controls. 
2 N1 – N5 refer to the five survey items on nonfinancial controls. 
3 B1 – B5 refer to the five survey items on behavioral controls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
TABLE 2. Mean scores of variables within clusters. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
      Clusters 
    _________________________________________________________ 
    C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 F-test p  
No. of companies   14 35 12 26 12 4   
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Financial control  
F1
1
    4.86 (3) 4.84 (4) 4.92 (1) 4.88 (2) 4.42 (5) 3.50 (6) 10.507 0.000 
F2    4.07 (4) 5.00 (1) 5.00 (1) 3.85 (5) 3.17 (6) 4.25 (3) 34.813 0.000 
F3    4.57 (3) 4.71 (2) 5.00 (1) 4.27 (4) 3.25 (5) 3.00 (6) 20.929 0.000 
F4    4.86 (2) 4.66 (3) 4.92 (1) 4.54 (4) 3.58 (6) 3.75 (5) 14.602 0.000 
F5    4.43 (3) 4.77 (2) 4.92 (1) 4.23 (4) 3.25 (6) 3.50 (5) 17.784 0.000 
 
Nonfinancial control 
N1
2
    4.43 (3) 4.29 (4) 4.92 (1) 4.46 (2) 3.83 (5) 3.75 (6)  5.109 0.000 
N2    3.93 (4) 4.83 (2) 5.00 (1) 3.65 (5) 3.25 (6) 4.75 (3) 24.940 0.000 
N3    4.07 (4) 4.29 (3) 5.00 (1) 4.38 (2) 3.33 (6) 4.00 (5) 11.329 0.000 
N4    3.93 (5) 4.17 (4) 5.00 (1) 4.31 (3) 3.42 (6) 4.50 (2)  7.169 0.000 
N5    3.86 (5) 4.09 (4) 5.00 (1) 4.31 (2) 3.17 (6) 4.25 (3) 12.509 0.000 
 
Behavioral control 
B1
3
    3.36 (6) 4.14 (3) 4.75 (1) 4.46 (2) 4.00 (4) 3.75 (5)  7.840 0.000 
B2    2.79 (6) 4.54 (2) 4.92 (1) 3.58 (4) 2.92 (5) 4.50 (3) 24.135 0.000 
B3    2.64 (6) 4.26 (2) 5.00 (1) 4.00 (3) 3.25 (5) 4.00 (3) 29.839 0.000 
B4    2.36 (6) 3.46 (4) 4.92 (1) 4.00 (3) 3.17 (5) 4.75 (2) 34.145 0.000 
B5    2.64 (6) 3.91 (4) 5.00 (1) 4.04 (3) 2.92 (5) 4.75 (2) 32.292 0.000 
 
Short-term profitability  10.92(4) 17.75(2) 21.12(1) 17.29(3)  2.3 (5) - 2.255 0.086  
 (n )    5 11  6 11  3 - 
Work experience   17.79(2) 17.06(3) 10.50(6) 12.12(5) 12.67(4) 20.00(1) 2.344 0.047 
 (n)    14 35 12 26 12 4 
Age of respondent  50.64(2) 51.03(1) 48.17(4) 46.19(6) 46.50(5) 50.00(3) 2.405 0.042 
 (n)     14 35 12 26 12 4 
Extent of world-scale          0.67 (2) 0.61 (4) 0.64 (3) 0.28 (6) 0.36 (5) 1.00 (1) 2.654 0.028 
 operations (n)   12 31 11 25 11 3 
Size    2289(2) 3315(1) 1382(4) 694 (5) 1523 (3) 112 (6) 4.210 0.003  
 (n)    7 23 10 12 7 1  
________________________________________________________________________ 
1 F1 – F5  refer to the five survey items on financial controls. 
2 N1 – N5 refer to the five survey items on nonfinancial controls. 
3 B1 – B5 refer to the five survey items on behavioral controls. 
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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 
The English Version of the Survey Questions Used in this Study 
 
 
 1a.  How important do you perceive each of the following types of measures to be in the evaluation of 
 overseas managers? (Please circle the appropriate number on the 5-point scale below.) 
 
                   Not At All      Of Little     There     Quite     Very 
                                           Important importance between important important 
 FINANCIAL CONTROLS (e.g., profit,  
 return-on-investment, and residual income)..........……….…………. 1 2 3 4 5 
  
 NONFINANCIAL CONTROLS (market 
 share, quality, production volume, etc.).….............……....................... 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS……………………………...……….... 1 2 3 4 5 
 (e.g., achieve cost budgets & production standards,  follow  
 rules & procedures, present expenditure cutting proposals, etc.) 
  
  
1b. How often do you arrange meetings with overseas managers to discuss their performance on the 
 following types of measures? (1=never, 2=seldom, 3=only if the performance is significantly below 
 expectations, 4=quite often, and 5=regularly). 
 
 FINANCIAL CONTROLS..................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
              NONFINANCIAL CONTROLS…..……………................................ 1  2 3 4 5 
 BEHAVIORAL………………………………………………….……. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1c. To what extent do the following types of 
 measures reflect whether overseas managers are 
 succeeding or failing with the business? 
                Not at all     A Little      Some     Quite       Very 
                                what       much      much 
 FINANCIAL CONTROLS..................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
 NONFINANCIAL CONTROLS………................................................ 1 2 3 4 5 
 BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS……………….……….……………...… 1 2 3 4 5 
 
1d. How much attention do you pay to periodic (i.e., weekly or  
 monthly) reports of results based on the following types of 
 measures, when you evaluate the performance of overseas  
 managers? 
 
 FINANCIAL CONTROLS..................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
 NONFINANCIAL CONTROLS………................................................ 1 2 3 4 5 
 BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS……………….…….………..……….… 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1e. How much impact do good or bad results measured in 
 the following types of measures have on the rated  
 performance of overseas managers? 
 
 FINANCIAL CONTROLS…................................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 
 NONFINANCIAL CONTROLS………................................................ 1 2 3 4 5 
 BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS……………………….…..……………. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
2. How many years have you served at your current company? _______ years. 
 
3. In what year were you born?  In ________. 
